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Abstract
We consider the situation in which a transmitter attempts to communicate reliably over a discrete memoryless
channel while simultaneously ensuring covertness (low probability of detection) with respect to a warden, who
observes the signals through another discrete memoryless channel. We develop a coding scheme based on the
principle of channel resolvability, which generalizes and extends prior work in several directions. First, it shows that,
irrespective of the quality of the channels, it is possible to communicate on the order of
√
n reliable and covert bits
over n channel uses if the transmitter and the receiver share on the order of
√
n key bits; this improves upon earlier
results requiring on the order of
√
n log n key bits. Second, it proves that, if the receiver’s channel is “better” than
the warden’s channel in a sense that we make precise, it is possible to communicate on the order of
√
n reliable and
covert bits over n channel uses without a secret key; this generalizes earlier results established for binary symmetric
channels. We also identify the fundamental limits of covert and secret communications in terms of the optimal
asymptotic scaling of the message size and key size, and we extend the analysis to Gaussian channels. The main
technical problem that we address is how to develop concentration inequalities for “low-weight” sequences; the crux
of our approach is to define suitably modified typical sets that are amenable to concentration inequalities.
I. INTRODUCTION
The benefits offered by ubiquitous communication networks are now mitigated by the relative ease with which
malicious users can interfere or tamper with sensitive data. The past decade has thus witnessed a growing concern for
the issues of privacy, confidentiality, and integrity of communications. In many instances, users in a communication
network find themselves in a position in which they wish to communicate without being detected by others. Such
situations include fairly innocuous scenarios of dynamic spectrum access in wireless channels, in which secondary
users attempt to communicate without being detected by primary users. A perhaps more adversarial example is a
situation in which a user wishes to convey information covertly, either to maintain his privacy, avoid attacks, or
escape the attention of regulatory entities monitoring the network.
Motivated by these challenges, [2], [3] have established the first characterization of the throughput at which two
users may communicate reliably over a noisy channel while guaranteeing a low probability of detection from a
warden, who observes the transmitted signal through another noisy channel. Specifically, it has been shown that
arbitrarily low probability of detection over pure loss quantum channels, thermal noise quantum channels, and
classical Gaussian channels, is possible as long as one communicates at most on the order of
√
n bits over n
uses of the channel; this scaling result has recently been refined to establish the optimal asymptotic throughput of
covert and reliable communication [4], [5]. One notable characteristic of the covert communication scheme in [2],
which we revisit in the present paper, is to require a secret key between the legitimate users with size on the order
of
√
n log n. These fundamental limits on covert communication may be viewed as the counterparts of the “square
root law” of steganography [6] when the message is embedded in a covertext with zero mean. The results of [2],
[3] have been further extended in several directions, in particular by showing that arbitrarily small probability of
detection is possible without secret-key when all users are connected by Binary Symmetric Channels (BSCs) and
provided the warden’s BSC noise is much larger than legitimate users’ BSC noise [7]; this result was also extended
to include secrecy constraints [8]. Other extensions have attempted to identify scenarios in which the “square root
law” may be beaten, which includes situations in which the channel statistics are imperfectly known [9], [10], [11],
[12], or when the warden has uncertainty about the time of communication [13], [14]. The ideas underlying the
keyless coding scheme are also connected to those developed for “stealth” and channel resolvability in the context
of wiretap channels [15], [16]. Tutorial presentations and discussions of these results may be found in [17], [18].
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2In the remainder of the paper, we use the terminology “covert communication” as a synonym for low-probability
of detection [19], [2], [3], deniability [7], [9], and undetectable communication [10], [11], since all terms refer
to the same definition. The main conceptual contribution of the present work is to revisit the problem of covert
communication from the perspective of resolvability [20], [21]. This conceptual connection allows us to establish
the following technical results that extend earlier work.
• We revisit the coding scheme of [2] that shows that on the order of
√
n reliable and covert bits may be
communicated over n channel uses with on the order of
√
n log n bits of secret key in a universal manner; this
is essentially a variation [2] with a technical refinement (Theorem 1, Corollary 1).
• We develop an alternative coding scheme such that, if the warden’s channel statistics are known, on the order
of
√
n reliable covert bits may be communicated over n channel uses with only on the order of
√
n bits of
secret key. In addition, if the legitimate user’s channel is “better” than the warden’s channel, in a sense that
is made precise in Section V, we show that no secret key is needed; in particular, this generalizes [7] to all
Discrete Memoryless Channels (DMCs) (Theorem 2, Corollary 2).
• We show that both the key size and the message size in our scheme are asymptotically optimal for DMCs by
adapting and extending the recent converse results of Wang et al. [4], [5] (Theorem 3, Theorem 4, Corollary 3).
• We extend the proposed covert communication scheme to include secrecy constraints (Theorem 5).
• We partially extend the results to continuous channels, and in particular to Additive White Gaussian Noise
(AWGN) channels (Theorem 6).
The underlying technical problem that we solve is how to develop random coding arguments for “low-weight”
codewords, in a sense that is precisely defined in Section III-B, for which naive concentration inequalities, such as
Hoeffding’s inequality, do not seem to apply. The crux of our approach is to define modified “typical sets” that are
amenable to concentration inequalities, which was inspired by an astute technique in [7] to “concentrate” the sum
of n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables over a sum of
√
n terms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section III formally introduces the problem of covert communication, sets the
notation, and establishes a few preliminary results that justify the proposed conceptual approach. Section IV revisits
the covert communication scheme of [2] from the perspective of source resolvability, while Section V develops an
alternative scheme using channel resolvability that turns out to be optimal. Section VI develops the converse proof
required to justify the optimality of the proposed scheme. Section VII presents several applications and extensions
of the results, including Gaussian channels.
II. NOTATION
We briefly introduce the notation used throughout the paper. Random variables and denoted by upper case letters,
e.g., X , while their realizations are denoted by lowercase, e.g, x. Vectors are denoted by boldface fonts, e.g., X
and x. When the length of the vector is not included as an exponent, it is implicitly assumed that vectors are of
length n ∈ N∗, i.e., X = (X1, · · · , Xn).
In all our calculations, log and exp are understood to the base e so that the underlying unit is a nat. However,
we allow ourselves to interpret and discuss our results in bits by converting log to the base two. For any x ∈ R, we
define [x]+ , max(x, 0).
For two distributions P , Q on some alphabet X , D(P‖Q) , ∑x P (x) log P (x)Q(x) is the Kullback-Leibler (KL)
divergence between P and Q, and V(P,Q) , 12
∑
x |P (x)−Q(x)| is the total variation between P and Q. Pinsker’s
inequality ensures that V(P,Q)2 6 12D(P‖Q), which we will loosen as V(P,Q)2 6 D(P‖Q) for simplicity. We say
that P is absolutely continuous with respect to (w.r.t.) Q, denoted P  Q, if for all x ∈ X P (x) = 0 if Q(x) = 0.
We also denote P ⊗n the product distribution
∏n
i=1 P on X n.
For the reader’s convenience, Table I also provides a summary of the notation often used throughout the paper.
III. COVERT COMMUNICATION OVER NOISY CHANNELS
We consider the situation illustrated in Fig. 1, in which two legitimate users, Alice and Bob, attempt to
communicate over a DMC (X ,WY |X ,Y) without being detected by a warden, Willie, who observes the signals
through another DMC (X ,WZ|X ,Z). The transition probabilities corresponding to n uses of the channel are denoted
W ⊗nY |X ,
∏n
i=1WY |X and W
⊗n
Z|X ,
∏n
i=1WZ|X . We also make the following assumptions.
3TABLE I
COMMONLY USED NOTATION
X = {x0, x1} Channel input alphabet, with innocent symbol x0
{ωn}n>1 Indexed sequence with value in {0, 1}
αn ωn/
√
n
P0 Channel output distribution WY |X=x0
P1 Channel output distribution WY |X=x1
Q0 Channel output distribution WZ|X=x0
Q1 Channel output distribution WZ|X=x1
Παn Channel input distribution such that Παn(x1) = αn
Pαn Channel output distribution Pαn = αnP1 + (1− αn)P0
Qαn Channel output distribution Qαn = αnQ1 + (1− αn)Q0
µ0 Minimum probability in support of Q0, i.e., minz:Q0(z)>0Q0(z)
• There exists an innocent symbol x0 ∈ X that corresponds to the input to the channel when no communication
takes place. In such a case, the distributions induced by x0 at the output of the two memoryless channels are
P0 ,WY |X=x0 and Q0 ,WZ|X=x0 with µ0 , min
z:Q0(z)>0
Q0(z). (1)
• There exists another symbol x1 ∈ X with x1 6= x0, and we define the distributions induced by x1 at the output
of the memoryless channels
P1 ,WY |X=x1 and Q1 ,WZ|X=x1 . (2)
• Q1  Q0 and Q1 6= Q0, which ensures that the problem is not trivial, by excluding the situations in which
Willie would always detect transmission with non-vanishing probability or would never detect it. As shown in
Appendix G, Alice and Bob would then communicate zero or on the order of n covert bits, respectively.
• P1  P0, which guarantees that Bob does not obtain an unfair advantage over Willie, by excluding the situation
in which Bob could identify the location of some uncorrupted x1-symbols. As shown in Appendix G Alice
and Bob would then communicate on the order of
√
n log n covert bits instead of
√
n.
The restriction to a single symbol x1 6= x0 eases the presentation of the results, but we shall see in Section VII-B
that it incurs little loss of generality. We also discuss partial extensions of the results to AWGN channels in
Section VII-D. Although the absolute continuity requirements restrict the class of channels considered, they are
nevertheless satisfied for large classes of channels of interest. For instance, for AWGN channels, x0 = 0 is the
natural choice of the innocent symbol, and the absolute continuity requirements are satisfied.
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Fig. 1. Model of covert communication channel.
Formally, Alice’s objective is to transmit a message W uniformly distributed in J1,MK by encoding it into a
codeword X = (X1, . . . , Xn) of n symbols with the help of a secret key S uniformly distributed in J1,KK. At the
beginning of every block of n symbols, Alice sets the value of a switch T : if T = 1, the output of the encoder
is connected to the channel; else, if T = 0, the innocent symbol x0 is sent n times through the channel. Upon
observing a noisy version Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) of X and knowing S, Bob’s objective is to form reliable estimates T̂
and Ŵ of T and W , respectively. Reliability is measured by the average probability of error
Perr , ES(P(W 6= Ŵ |S, T = 1)) + P(T̂ 6= 0|T = 0). (3)
4In contrast, Willie’s goal is to perform a statistical test on his observation Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) to decide whether Alice
and Bob communicate (hypothesis H1) or not (hypothesis H0). The probability of Type I error (rejecting H0 when
true) is denoted α, while the probability of Type II error (accepting H0 when wrong) is denoted β. It is possible for
Willie to design blind tests that ignore his channel observations, and that achieve any pair (α, β) such that α+β = 1.
Therefore, the objective of covert communication is to guarantee that Willie’s best statistical test yields a trade-off
between α and β that is not much better than that of a blind test. Specifically, let Q⊗n0 ,
∏n
i=1Q0 be the product
distribution that is expected by Willie when no communication happens, and let Q̂n be the distribution expected
when communication takes place. It can be shown [22] that Willie’s optimal hypothesis test satisfies the tradeoff
α+ β > 1−
√
D
(
Q̂
n‖Q⊗n0
)
. Therefore, achieving covert communication amounts to ensuring that D(Q̂n‖Q⊗n0 ) is
negligible. We provide further discussion of the role of D(·‖·) as a measure of covertness in Appendix A.
Consequently, we aim to establish scalings of logM and logK with n for which there exist covert communication
schemes with
lim
n→∞Perr = 0 and limn→∞D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
= 0. (4)
A. Covert processes
For n ∈ N∗, let αn ∈]0; 1[. Define the input distribution Παn on {x0, x1} such that Παn(x1) = 1−Παn(x0) = αn,
as well as the corresponding output distributions
Qαn(z) =
∑
x
WZ|X(z|x)Παn(x) = Q1(z)αn +Q0(z)(1− αn), (5)
Pαn(y) =
∑
x
WY |X(y|x)Παn(x) = P1(y)αn + P0(y)(1− αn). (6)
Also define the product distributions
Π⊗nαn =
n∏
i=1
Παn , Q
⊗n
αn =
n∏
i=1
Qαn , and P
⊗n
αn =
n∏
i=1
Pαn . (7)
Note that Q1  Q0 implies Qαn  Q0 and that P1  P0 implies Pαn  P0. We then have the following result,
whose proof may be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 1. Let {αn}n>1 be such that αn ∈]0; 1[ and limn→∞ αn = 0. Let Q0 and Qαn be defined as per (1)
and (5), respectively. Define for every integer k > 2
χ
k
(Q1‖Q0) ,
∑
z∈Z
(Q1(z)−Q0(z))k
Q0(z)k−1
and η
k
(Q1‖Q0) ,
∑
z∈Z:Q1(z)−Q0(z)<0
(Q1(z)−Q0(z))k
Q0(z)k−1
. (8)
Then, for any n ∈ N∗,
D(Qαn‖Q0) 6
α2n
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)− α
3
n
6
χ
3
(Q1‖Q0) + α
4
n
3
χ
4
(Q1‖Q0) . (9)
For n large enough,
D(Qαn‖Q0) >
α2n
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)− α3n
(
1
2
χ
3
(Q1‖Q0)− 2
3
η
3
(Q1‖Q0)
)
+
2α4n
3
η
4
(Q1‖Q0) . (10)
Finally, consider the joint random variables (X,Z) ∈ {x0, x1} × Z with distribution WZ|X(z|x)Παn(x). Then,
I(X;Z) = αnD(Q1‖Q0)− D(Qαn‖Q0). (11)
Remark. The inequalities (9) and (10) may be loosened for n large enough as
α2n
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0) (1 +√αn) > D(Qαn‖Q0) >
α2n
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0) (1−√αn) . (12)
These bounds are not tight, and one may exhibit distributions for which the inequalities are strict. Nevertheless, this
allows us to obtain the correct first order and second order in αn of I(X;Z), which is all we use in the remainder
of the paper. The bounds also allow us to circumvent the rather painful Taylor series of I(X;Z) in αn.
5For the specific choice αn , ωn√n with ωn = o(1) ∩ ω(1/
√
n) as n→∞, i.e.,1
lim
n→∞ωn = 0 and limn→∞ωn
√
n =∞, (13)
we have
lim
n→∞D
(
Q⊗nαn‖Q⊗n0
)
= lim
n→∞nD(Qαn‖Q0) = 0, (14)
so that Q⊗nαn becomes indistinguishable from Q
⊗n
0 ; therefore, we call the process Q
⊗n
αn a “covert stochastic process.”
In addition, the realizations of the input process Παn contain an average of ωn
√
n realizations of the x1 symbol,
which grows to infinity with n; this opens the possibility of embedding information symbols in the channel input
while remaining covert. Essentially, the result of Lemma 1 formalizes the intuition that the change in the distribution
perceived by the warden is indistinguishable from statistical noise as long as the number of x1 symbols transmitted
in a sequence of n symbols does not exceed
√
n. The fact that a stochastic process with a non-trivial number of x1
symbols may induce an undetectable covert stochastic process at the output of a noisy channel, suggests a generic
principle for the design of covert communication schemes, which we formulate as follows.
Covert communication schemes should attempt to simulate a covert stochastic process Q⊗nαn .
The covert communication schemes developed in Section IV and Section V correspond to different applications
of this principle.
B. Technical digression: concentration inequalities with low-weight sequences
One of the technical challenges faced when trying to deal with stochastic processes such as Π⊗nαn in (7), is that
the naive concentration inequalities traditionally used to develop information-theoretic results do not seem to apply
here. To be more concrete, consider the joint random variables (X,Z) ∈ X n ×Zn with the product distribution∏n
i=1WZ|X(zi|xi)Παn(xi); define the mutual information random variable [21]
log
W ⊗nZ|X(Z|X)
Q⊗nαn(Z)
=
n∑
i=1
log
WZ|X(Zi|Xi)
Qαn(Zi)
, (15)
whose average is the average mutual information I(X;Z) = nI(X;Z). Assuming for simplicity that the range of
log
WZ|X(Zi|Xi)
Qαn (Zi)
is a finite interval of length η > 0,2 Hoeffding’s inequality states that for any µ > 0
P
(∣∣∣∣∣log W
⊗n
Z|X(Z|X)
Q⊗nαn(Z)
− nI(X;Z)
∣∣∣∣∣ > nµI(X;Z)
)
6 2 exp
(
−2nµ2I(X;Z)2
η2
)
. (16)
Unfortunately, this upper bound does not vanish because of the specific scaling of I(X;Z) with n given in (11) of
Lemma 1. The problem finds its roots in the “low weight” of the sequences X, i.e., the number of x1 symbols is
on average on the order of ωn
√
n, which is sub-linear in n.
There are, however, some concentration inequalities that are still useful and that will be exploited in virtually
all subsequent proofs. For instance, consider a binary random sequence S ∈ {0, 1}n with a product distribution∏n
i=1 PS such that PS(1) = 1− PS(0) = ωn√n . The sequence S is of low average weight ωn
√
n, but the application
of a Chernoff bound [23, Exercise 2.10] yields for any µ ∈]0; 1[
P
(∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
Si − ωn
√
n
∣∣∣∣∣ > µωn√n
)
6 2 exp
(
−µ
2ωn
√
n
3
)
, (17)
which vanishes with our choice of ωn. The difference between (17) and (16) may be intuitively understood as
follows. The number of terms contributing to
∑n
i=1 Si in (17) is on average ωn
√
n because most terms are zero.
1The choice of ωn will eventually control a tradeoff between the number of covert bits and their difficulty detection by the warden. To
obtain a large number of covert bits, one would choose a large ωn, say 1/ logn. In contrast, to make the bits harder to detect, one would
choose a small ωn, say logn/
√
n.
2This holds if the channel (X ,WZ|X ,Z) is a fully connected DMC, such as a BSC.
6In contrast, all the terms in
∑n
i=1 log
WZ|X(Zi|Xi)
Qαn (Zi)
are potential contributors to the sum in (16); the concentration
inequality (16) fails because the individual contributions of the terms in the sum are too small.
We note that an alternative approach to address this technical challenge would be to use more powerful concentration
inequalities, such as Bernstein’s or Bennet’s inequalities. We do not pursue this approach here and we rely instead
on the definition of suitable typical sets, which might be of independent interest.
IV. SOURCE-RESOLVABILITY BASED COVERT COMMUNICATION
In this section, we revisit the architecture for covert communication proposed in [2], which operates with a secret
key S of on the order of
√
n log n bits and allows the transmission of on the order of
√
n bits over n channel uses.
The main result developed in Theorem 1 is a reinterpretation of the scheme in [2] from the perspective of source
resolvability. For clarity, we assume here that T = 1 and no attempt is made to optimize the various constants
appearing in the analysis. An optimal scheme handling the general case is presented in Section V.
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Fig. 2. Covert communication scheme adapted from [2]. A secret key is used to create spreading sequences in time, which are undetectable
by the warden. Information is transmitted to the legitimate receiver by modulating the spreading sequences.
The communication scheme illustrated in Fig. 2 is an adaptation to DMCs of the scheme proposed in [2]
for AWGN channels, and it operates according to the following general principle.
1) Alice and Bob split the secret key S into two keys S˜ ∈ J1, K˜K and Ŝ ∈ J1, K̂K such that K˜K̂ = K.
2) Alice and Bob spread the secret key S˜ into a length n sequence X˜ ∈ {x0, x1}n.
3) Alice encodes the message W into a length n′ binary codeword B ∈ {0, 1}n′ , where n′ on the order of ωn
√
n
will be exactly specified later.
4) Alice transmits information by modulating the symbols of X˜ in the position i for which X˜i = x1, resulting in
a transmitted sequence X̂. Formally, consider realizations x˜, b, and ŝ, define
supp(x˜) , |i ∈ J1, nK : x˜i 6= x0| , (18)
and let {ij} with j ∈ J1, supp(x˜)K be the positions for which x˜ij 6= x0. The symbols of the modulated
sequence x̂ are defined as
x̂i =

xbj⊕sˆj if ∃j ∈ J1,min(supp(x˜), n′)K such that i = ij
xsˆj if ∃j ∈ Jmin(supp(x˜), n′), supp(x˜)K such that i = ij
x0 otherwise.
(19)
Effectively, the modulated sequence X̂ is obtained by transmitting the sequence X˜ through a memoryless
Z-channel, in which the x0 symbol is unaffected and the x1 symbol is flipped to the x0 symbol with probability
1
2 . We denote the transition probability of this Z channel by WX̂|X˜ , and we let
WZ|X˜(z|x) ,
∑
xˆ
WZ|X(z|xˆ)WX̂|X˜(xˆ|x). (20)
75) Upon observing the channel output Y, Bob uses his knowledge of X˜ to create a sequence Ŷ =
(
Yi1 , . . . , Yisupp(X˜)
)
.
If supp(X˜) < n′, Bob declares an error; otherwise, it attempts to decode Ŷ with Ŝ to form an estimate Ŵ of
W .
Following the principle outlined in Section III-A, we first attempt to simulate the process Q⊗nαn by simulating
the process Π⊗nαn defined as per (7) at the input of the channel. Specifically, the secret key S˜ is encoded into a
sequence X˜ ∈ {x0, x1}n such that the distribution PX˜ of X˜ is close to Π⊗nαn . The following theorem characterizes
the performance of this covert communication scheme.
Theorem 1. Consider a discrete memoryless covert communication channel with P1  P0, Q1  Q0, and
Q1 6= Q0. Let C be the capacity of the main channel with inputs restricted to {x0, x1} and let βn , 12 ωn√n with
ωn ∈ o(1) ∩ ω( 1√n) as n→∞. For any ξ ∈]0; 1[, there exist ξ1, ξ2 > 0 depending on ξ, WY |X but not on WZ|X ,
and a covert communication scheme as in Fig. 2 such that, for n large enough:
logM = (1− ξ)ωn
√
nC, logK = (1 + ξ)ωn
√
n log n, (21)
and
P(W 6= Ŵ |T = 1) 6 e−ξ1ωn
√
n,
∣∣D(Q̂n‖Q⊗n0 )− D(Q⊗nβn‖Q⊗n0 )∣∣ 6 e−ξ2ωn√n. (22)
This scheme is universal w.r.t. the warden’s channel, in the sense that D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
is bounded for n large enough
as soon as χ
2
(Q1‖Q0), χ3(Q1‖Q0), and χ4(Q1‖Q0) are bounded, irrespective of the exact statistics WZ|X .
Remark. With some extra work, one may prove that the key S˜ is not necessary. Specifically, one can develop a
random coding argument that includes the random generation of the code used by the legitimate users, and establish
similar results without relying on a key S˜. We omit the proof, which is slightly more involved but does not affect the
scaling in n. Also note that S˜ acts as a one-time pad on the message, which guarantees that the message is kept
confidential from the warden.
Proof: The proof of Theorem 1 consists in showing the existence of a deterministic encoder to generate X˜
from the key S˜, and the existence of a codebook with blocklength approximately ωn
√
n to modulate X˜ into X̂.
a) Existence of spreading code: Let K˜ ∈ N∗,  ∈]0; 1[, and define the set
T n ,
{
x ∈ X n : (1− )ωn
√
n 6 supp(x) 6 (1 + )ωn
√
n
}
. (23)
Generate K˜ codewords x˜i ∈ {x0, x1}n independently at random according to the distribution
Πnαn,(x) ,
1{x ∈ T n }
λn
Π⊗nαn(x) with αn ,
ωn√
n
and λn , PΠ⊗nαn (X ∈ T n ). (24)
Using a Chernoff bound, we have
1− λn = PΠ⊗nαn (X /∈ T n ) 6 2e−
1
3
2ωn
√
n. (25)
Finally, define the output distribution corresponding to Πnαn, as
Qnαn, ,
∑
x
W ⊗nZ|X(z|x)Πnαn,(x). (26)
The encoder spreads a secret key s˜ ∈ J1, K˜K into a sequence x˜ ∈ {x0, x1}n according to the map J1, K˜K →
{x0, x1}n : s˜ 7→ x˜s˜. The resulting spreading sequence distribution is then
PX˜(x) =
K˜∑
i=1
1
K˜
1 {x = x˜i} . (27)
Our objective is to show that for suitably large K˜, the spreading sequence distribution PX˜ is close to the product
distribution Π⊗nαn . This is actually a variation of source resolvability [20], which we detail to carefully handle the
dependence of Π⊗nαn on αn. As shown in Appendix C, the average of D
(
PX˜‖Π⊗nαn
)
over the random code generation
satisfies the following.
8Lemma 2. For any γ > 0 and all n ∈ N∗ large enough,
E
(
D
(
PX˜‖Π⊗nαn
))
6 n
λn
log
(
2
αn
)
PΠ⊗nαn
(
supp(X) > γ + n log(1− αn)
log 1−αnαn
)
+ log
(
1
λn
+
eγ
K˜
)
. (28)
For any µ > 0, by choosing
γ = (1 + µ)ωn
√
n log
(
1
αn
− 1
)
− nlog(1− αn) (29)
and noticing that supp(X) =
∑n
i=1 1{Xi = x1} with EΠ⊗nαn (supp(X)) = ωn
√
n, we obtain with a Chernoff bound
PΠ⊗nαn
(
supp(X) > γ + n log(1− αn)
log 1−αnαn
)
= PΠ⊗nαn
(
supp(X) > (1 + µ)ωn
√
n
)
6 e− 13µ2ωn
√
n. (30)
With αn = ωn√n as per (13), notice that
γ = (1 + µ)ωn
√
n log
(
1
αn
− 1
)
− nlog(1− αn) 6 (1 + µ)ωn
√
n
(
log
√
n− logωn
)
+
nωn√
n− ωn (31)
where we have used the inequality log(1 + x) > x1+x for x ∈] − 1;∞[. For n large enough, we also have
log
√
n− logωn < log n by (13) and
√
n−ωn >
√
n
µ logn , so that γ 6 (1+2µ)ωn
√
n log n and log 2αn 6 log 2+log n.
Hence, choosing
log K˜ = (1 + δ)(1 + 2µ)ωn
√
n log n with any δ > 0, (32)
we obtain for n large enough
E
(
D
(
PX˜‖Π⊗nαn
))
6 e−ρωn
√
n with some appropriately defined ρ > 0. (33)
In particular, there exists a specific code for which
D
(
PX˜‖Π⊗nαn
)
6 e−ρωn
√
n and V
(
PX˜,Π
⊗n
αn
)
6 e− 12ρωn
√
n, (34)
where the bound on V(·, ·) follows by Pinsker’s inequality.
b) Effect of modulation: Irrespective of the error-control code used to encode W , modulation requires at most
log K̂ = (1 + )ωn
√
n (35)
by the constraint imposed in (23), which is negligible compared to log K˜ in (32). When presenting the distribution
Παn at the input of the Z-channel WX̂|X˜ induced by the modulation, one may check that the corresponding
distribution at the output of the Z-channel is Πβn with βn , αn2 . Consequently, we have by the data processing
inequality
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nβn
)
6 D
(
PX˜‖Π⊗nαn
)
and V
(
Q̂n, Q⊗nβn
)
6 V
(
PX˜,Π
⊗n
αn
)
. (36)
Next, notice that
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
= D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nβn
)
+
∑
z
Q̂n(z) log
Q⊗nβn(z)
Q⊗n0 (z)
(37)
= D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nβn
)
+ D
(
Q⊗nβn‖Q⊗n0
)
+
∑
z
(
Q̂n(z)−Q⊗nβn(z)
)
log
Q⊗nβn(z)
Q⊗n0 (z)
, (38)
with ∣∣∣∣∣∑
z
(
Q̂n(z)−Q⊗nβn(z)
)
log
Q⊗nβn(z)
Q⊗n0 (z)
∣∣∣∣∣ 6 nV(Q̂n, Q⊗nβn) log 1µ0 6 ne− 12ρωn√n log 1µ0 . (39)
Hence, combining (34)-(39), we conclude that there exists a constant ξ2 > 0 such that, for n large enough,∣∣D(Q̂n‖Q⊗n0 )− D(Q⊗nβn‖Q⊗n0 )∣∣ 6 e−ξ2ωn√n. (40)
9c) Reliability: We conclude the proof by showing how one may encode the messages W into codewords B.
Assume that the main channel has capacity C when inputs are restricted to the set {x0, x1}. Standard arguments [24]
show that, for any δ > 0, there exists a binary code of length (1− )ωn
√
n, such that one may choose
logM = (1− δ)(1− )ωn
√
nC (41)
with probability of error
Perr 6 e−ξ1ωn
√
n, (42)
where ξ1 > 0 depend on δ, , and WY |X .
Combining the choice of log K̂, log K˜, and logM , in (32), (35), (41), with the bounds obtained in (40) and (42),
one may then find the appropriate constant ξ promised in the statement of the theorem.
The interpretation of Theorem 1 is the same as in [2, Theorem 1.2]. However, our underlying covert communication
scheme is slightly different, as the key S may be viewed as the seed to generate a “spreading sequence,” rather than
a way to index the positions for transmission. Technically, the result also differs from [2] by ensuring a bound on the
maximum key size instead on the average key size, although it is still on the order of
√
n log n. Finally, Theorem 1
relies on more sophisticated resolvability techniques [21], whose usefulness will become apparent in Section V.
From Theorem 1, one may now attempt to establish asymptotic limits akin to capacity. Unlike traditional
information theoretic problems, there seems to be no strong converse and the factor ωn that controls the decay of
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
also affects logM . Consequently, following the approach of [5], logM is scaled by
√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Q⊗n0
)
to obtain a meaningful asymptotic constant.
Corollary 1. Consider a discrete memoryless covert communication channel with P1  P0, Q1  Q0, and
Q1 6= Q0. Let C be the capacity of the main channel with inputs restricted to {x0, x1}. For any ξ ∈]0; 1[, there
exist covert communication schemes such that
lim
n→∞D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
= 0, lim
n→∞P(W 6= Ŵ |T = 1) = 0,
and
lim
n→∞
logM√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Q⊗n0
) = 2(1− ξ)
√
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)C, limn→∞
logK√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Q⊗n0
) =∞.
Proof: Consider a sequence of coding schemes as identified by Theorem 1 for some ξ > 0. Then, using the
remark after Lemma 1, we have
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
6 nD(Qβn‖Q0) + e−ξ2ωn
√
n 6 ω
2
n
8
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)
(
1 +
√
ωn
2
√
n
)
+ e−ξ2ωn
√
n, (43)
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
> nD(Qβn‖Q0)− e−ξ2ωn
√
n > ω
2
n
8
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)
(
1−
√
ωn
2
√
n
)
− e−ξ2ωn
√
n. (44)
Hence, limn→∞D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
= 0, and using the constraints on ωn as per (13), we obtain
lim
n→∞
logM√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Q⊗n0
) > limn→∞ (1− ξ)ωn
√
nC
ωn
√
n
√
1
8χ2(Q1‖Q0) (1 + ωn2√n) + 1ω2n e−ξ2ωn
√
n
= 2
√
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)(1− ξ)C, (45)
lim
n→∞
logM√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Q⊗n0
) 6 limn→∞ (1− ξ)ωn
√
nC
ωn
√
n
√
1
8χ2(Q1‖Q0) (1− ωn2√n)− 1ω2n e−ξ2ωn
√
n
= 2
√
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)(1− ξ)C. (46)
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V. CHANNEL-RESOLVABILITY BASED COVERT COMMUNICATION
The covert communication scheme analyzed in Theorem 1 requires a key size on the order of ωn
√
n log n bits to
transmit on the order of ωn
√
n bits. In a practical implementation of the coding scheme, the key is likely to stem
from a pseudo-random number generator, which opens the proposed scheme to attacks that could get particularly
detrimental as the required key gets longer. Fortunately, we show next how the scheme may be suitably modified to
use a key size on the order of ωn
√
n bits. The idea behind the improvement is to use the key S to help directly
simulate the covert process Q⊗nαn defined as per (7), without simulating the process Π
⊗n
αn . Conceptually, the idea is to
rely on channel resolvability in place of source resolvability, but the precise analysis requires some care because of
the “low weight” nature of the process Π⊗nαn . The use of channel resolvability also enables one to improve upon the
value of logM in Theorem 1. The proposed architecture is illustrated in Fig. 3. The key S is used to select one of
K codebooks, each containing M codewords for encoding message W . The underlying idea is then to guarantee
that each codebook is sufficiently small to ensure reliability over the main channel while ensuring that there are
sufficiently many distinct codewords overall to keep the warden confused.
H0 : Q
 n
0
A B
W
DETECTOR
Z
YX
WY |X
WZ|X
W
S
 W
H1 :  Qn
ENC 1
ENC 2
ENC K
DEC 1
DEC 2
DEC K
...
...
x0
T
Fig. 3. Channel-resolvability based covert communication. The key S is used to select one of K possible codebooks.
Theorem 2. Consider a discrete memoryless covert communication channel with P1  P0, Q1  Q0, and Q1 6= Q0.
Let αn , ωn√n with ωn ∈ o(1) ∩ ω( 1√n) as n→∞. For any ξ ∈]0; 1[, there exist ξ1, ξ2 > 0 depending on ξ, WY |X ,
WZ|X , and a covert communication scheme as in Fig. 3 such that, for n large enough,
logM = (1− ξ)ωn
√
nD(P1‖P0),
logK = ωn
√
n [(1 + ξ)D(Q1‖Q0)− (1− ξ)D(P1‖P0)]+ ,
and
Perr 6 e−ξ1ωn
√
n,
∣∣D(Q̂n‖Q⊗n0 )− D(Q⊗nαn‖Q⊗n0 )∣∣ 6 e−ξ2ωn√n.
Remark. The proof of Theorem 2 actually shows an exponential concentration result, in the sense that a randomly
generated codebook satisfies the reliabilty and covertness conditions with probability at least 1− e−θωn
√
n for some
θ > 0. In some cases, it is possible to strengthen the result and show a super-exponential concentration result [8],
in the sense that a randomly generated codebook satisfies the reliability and covertness conditions with probability
at least 1− e−eθωn
√
n
for some θ > 0.
Notice that no key is needed if D(P1‖P0) > D(Q1‖Q0) by choosing ξ small enough, in which case a single
codebook (K = 1) is sufficient to achieve both resolvability and reliability simultaneously. In contrast, when
D(P1‖P0) 6 D(Q1‖Q0), the proposed scheme requires a key to achieve covert communication.
Proof: The proof of Theorem 2 is essentially a random coding argument for channel reliability [25] and channel
resolvability [26]; however, because the number of bits communicated is on the order of ωn
√
n over n channel uses,
naive concentration inequalities do not seem to apply directly. The idea we exploit to circumvent this technical
issue is to use suitably modified typical sets.
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d) Random codebook generation: Let M,K ∈ N∗. Generate MK codewords xij ∈ {x0, x1}n with i ∈ J1,MK
and j ∈ J1,KK independently according to the product distribution Π⊗nαn . Define the set3
Anγ ,
{
(x,y) ∈ X n × Yn : log
W ⊗nY |X(y|x)
P ⊗n0 (y)
> γ
}
(47)
where γ > 0 will be determined later. The encoder simply maps a message i and a key j to the codeword xij . The
decoder, which has access to y and the key j, operates as follows:
• if there exists a unique i ∈ J1,MK such that (xij ,y) ∈ Anγ , output T̂ = 1 and Ŵ = i;
• if there is no codeword i such that (xij ,y) ∈ Anγ , declare there was no communication and T̂ = 0;4
• otherwise, declare a decoding error.
e) Channel reliability analysis: As shown in Appendix D, the probability of decoding error Perr averaged of
the random codebook satisfies the following.
Lemma 3. For any γ > 0,
E(Perr) 6 PW ⊗nY |XΠ⊗nαn
(
log
W ⊗nY |X(Y|X)
P ⊗n0 (Y)
6 γ
)
+Me−γ(1 + exp
(
ω2n(ζ − 1)
)
) with ζ ,
∑
y
P1(y)
2
P0(y)
. (48)
We now analyze the first term on the right-hand side of (48) more precisely. Since W ⊗nY |X and Π
⊗n
αn are product
distributions,
PW ⊗nY |XΠ⊗nαn
(
log
W ⊗nY |X(Y|X)
P ⊗n0 (y)
6 γ
)
= PW ⊗nY |XΠ⊗nαn
(
n∑
i=1
log
WY |X(Yi|Xi)
P0(Yi)
6 γ
)
. (49)
If Xi = x0, note that Yi is distributed according to P0 and that log
WY |X(Yi|x0)
P0(Yi)
= 0. Similarly, if Xi = x1, Yi is
distributed according to P1 and log
WY |X(Yi|x1)
P0(Yi)
= log P1(Yi)P0(Yi) . Consequently, although the sum in (49) contains n terms,
only those for which Xi = x1 contribute to it. Therefore, we introduce the random variable L ,
∑n
i=1 1 {Xi = x1},
so that
PW ⊗nY |XΠ⊗nαn
(
n∑
i=1
log
WY |X(Yi|Xi)
P0(Yi)
6 γ
)
= EL
(
PW ⊗nY |XΠ⊗nαn
(
n∑
i=1
log
WY |X(Yi|Xi)
P0(Yi)
6 γ
)∣∣∣∣∣L
)
= EL
(
PP ⊗L1
(
L∑
i=1
log
P1(Yi)
P0(Yi)
6 γ
)∣∣∣∣∣L
)
(50)
Let µ, ν ∈]0; 1[ and set
γ , (1− µ)(1− ν)ωn
√
nD(P1‖P0) and Cnµ , {` ∈ N∗ : ` > (1− µ)ωn
√
n}. (51)
Intuitively, exp γ represents the number of codewords in a codebook while Cnµ represents the likely support size of
the codewords. Then,
EL
(
PP ⊗L1
(
L∑
i=1
log
P1(Yi)
P0(Yi)
6 γ
)∣∣∣∣∣L
)
6
∑
`∈Cnµ
P(L = `)PP ⊗`1
(∑`
i=1
log
P1(Yi)
P0(Yi)
6 γ
)
+ P
(
L /∈ Cnµ
)
(52)
Since E(L) =
∑n
i=1 E(1 {Xi = x1}) = ωn
√
n, we obtain with a Chernoff bound
P
(
L /∈ Cnµ
)
= P(L 6 (1− µ)E(L)) 6 e− 12µ2ωn
√
n. (53)
For ` ∈ Cnµ , we have
(1− µ)(1− ν)ωn
√
n− ` < (1− ν)`− ` = −ν` (54)
3The traditional typical set for decoding is similar to Anγ but with P ⊗nαn (y) in place of P ⊗n0 (y) [25]. This amounts to using the information
density in place of the relative entropy density.
4Since the scheme sometimes allows keyless operation (K = 1), the decoder must be able to identify the absence of transmission without
relying on a key.
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so that
PP ⊗`1
(∑`
i=1
log
P1(Yi)
P0(Yi)
6 γ
)
= PP ⊗`1
(∑`
i=1
log
P1(Yi)
P0(Yi)
− `D(P1‖P0) 6 γ − `D(P1‖P0)
)
6 PP ⊗`1
(∑`
i=1
log
P1(Yi)
P0(Yi)
− `D(P1‖P0) 6 −ν`D(P1‖P0)
)
6 Ae−a` for some constants A, a > 0 (55)
6 Ae−a(1−µ)ωn
√
n, (56)
where the constants A and a are obtained using a concentration inequality, such as Hoeffding’s inequality.5 Combining,
(50)-(56) with (49), and substituting in (48), we obtain
E(Perr) 6 Ae−a(1−µ)ωn
√
n + e−
1
2
µ2ωn
√
n +Me−γ
(
1 + eω
2
n(ζ−1)
)
. (57)
Hence, if
logM = (1− δ)(1− µ)(1− ν)ωn
√
nD(P1‖P0) with δ ∈]0; 1[, (58)
we obtain
E(Perr) 6 Ae−a(1−µ)ωn
√
n + e−
1
2
µ2ωn
√
n + e−δ(1−µ)(1−ν)ωn
√
nD(P1‖P0)
(
1 + eω
2
n(ζ−1)
)
(59)
For n large enough, with the choice of ωn in (13), 1 + exp
(
ω2n(ζ − 1)
)
6 e so that
E(Perr) 6 e−ρ1ωn
√
n for some appropriate choice of ρ1 > 0. (60)
f) Channel resolvability analysis: The objective is to show that the distribution
Q̂n(z) ,
M∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
W ⊗nZ|X(z|xij)
1
MK
induced by the codebooks is close in divergence to Q⊗nαn(z). The proof largely follows that of[15], with the appropriate
modifications. As shown in Appendix E the divergence D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
)
averaged over the random codebook satisfies
the following.
Lemma 4. For any τ > 0 and for n large enough,
E
(
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
))
6 n log 4
µ0
PW ⊗nZ|XΠ⊗nαn
(
log
W ⊗nZ|X(Z|X)
Q⊗n0 (Z)
> τ
)
+
eτ
MK
. (61)
Note that
PW ⊗nZ|XΠ⊗nαn
(
log
W ⊗nZ|X(Z|X)
Q⊗n0 (Z)
> τ
)
= PW ⊗nZ|XΠ⊗nαn
(
n∑
i=1
log
WZ|X(Zi|Xi)
Q0(Zi)
> τ
)
. (62)
As in the channel reliability analysis, if Xi = x0, note that Zi is distributed according to Q0 and that log
WZ|X(Zi|x0)
Q0(Zi)
=
0; if Xi = x1, then Zi is distributed according to Q1 and log
WZ|X(Zi|x1)
Q0(Zi)
= log Q1(Zi)Q0(Zi) . Hence, we may proceed as
earlier, by introducing L ,
∑n
i=1 1{Xi = x1} and defining
τ , (1 + µ)(1 + ν)ωn
√
nD(Q1‖Q0) and Dnµ , {` ∈ N∗ :
∣∣`− ωn√n∣∣ < µωn√n}. (63)
5log P1(Y )
P0(Y )
is bounded under our assumptions.
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Intuitively, exp τ represents the total number of codewords while Dµ is their likely support size. The set Dµ differs
from Cµ by requiring a double-sided bound, which captures the idea that the support of codewords should not be
too small for reliability but not too high either to remain covert. Then,
PW ⊗nZ|XΠ⊗nαn
(
n∑
i=1
log
WZ|X(Zi|Xi)
Q0(Zi)
> τ
)
6
∑
`∈Dnµ
P(L = `)PQ⊗`1
(∑`
i=1
log
Q1(Zi)
Q0(Zi)
> τ
)
+ P
(
L /∈ Dnµ
)
(64)
with, using a Chernoff bound,
P
(
L /∈ Dnµ
)
= P
(∣∣L− ωn√n∣∣ 6 µωn√n) 6 2e− 13µ2ωn√n. (65)
For ` ∈ Dnµ , note that
(1 + µ)(1 + ν)ωn
√
n− ` > (1 + ν)`− ` = ν`, (66)
so that
PQ⊗`1
(∑`
i=1
log
Q1(Zi)
Q0(Zi)
> τ
)
= PQ⊗`1
(∑`
i=1
log
Q1(Zi)
Q0(Zi)
− `D(Q1‖Q0) > τ − `D(Q1‖Q0)
)
(67)
6 PQ⊗`1
(∑`
i=1
log
Q1(Zi)
Q0(Zi)
− `D(Q1‖Q0) > νD(Q1‖Q0)`
)
(68)
6 Be−b` for some constants B, b > 0 (69)
6 Be−b(1−µ)ωn
√
n, (70)
where the constants B and b are again obtained using Hoeffding’s inequality. Combining, the inequalities (62)-(70)
with Lemma 4 and choosing
logM + logK = (1 + δ)(1 + µ)(1 + ν)ωn
√
nD(Q1‖Q0), (71)
we obtain
E
(
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
))
6 n log 4
µ0
(
Be−b(1−µ)ωn
√
n + 2e−
1
3
µ2ωn
√
n
)
+ e−δ(1+µ)(1+ν)ωn
√
nD(Q1‖Q0). (72)
Hence, for n large enough,
E
(
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
))
6 e−ρ2ωn
√
n for some appropriate choice of ρ2 > 0. (73)
g) Identification of specific code: Choosing µ, ν, δ, logM , and logK, to satisfy both (58) and (71), Markov’s
inequality allows us to conclude that there exists at least one specific coding scheme with n large enough and
appropriate constants ξ1, ρ3 > 0 such that
Perr 6 e−ξ1ωn
√
n and D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
)
6 e−ρ3ωn
√
n. (74)
In particular, Pinsker’s inequality also ensures that V
(
Q̂n, Q⊗nαn
)
6 e− 12ρ3ωn
√
n. Next, notice that
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
= D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
)
+
∑
z
Q̂n(z) log
Q⊗nαn(z)
Q⊗n0 (z)
(75)
= D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
)
+ D
(
Q⊗nαn‖Q⊗n0
)
+
∑
z
(
Q̂n(z)−Q⊗nαn(z)
)
log
Q⊗nαn(z)
Q⊗n0 (z)
(76)
and ∣∣∣∣∣∑
z
(
Q̂n(z)−Q⊗nαn(z)
)
log
Q⊗nαn(z)
Q⊗n0 (z)
∣∣∣∣∣ 6 2nV(Q̂n, Q⊗nαn) log 1µ0 6 2ne− 12ρ3ωn√n log 1µ0 . (77)
Hence, combining (74)-(77), we conclude that there exists a constant ξ2 > 0 such that, for n large enough,∣∣D(Q̂n‖Q⊗n0 )− D(Q⊗nαn‖Q⊗n0 )∣∣ 6 e−ξ2ωn√n.
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The statement of the theorem is finally obtained by setting ξ , 12 ((1 + δ)(1 + µ)(1 + ν)− (1− δ)(1− µ)(1− ν)).
Remark. A closer inspection of Appendix D shows that Lemma 3 applies to continuous channels. The concentration
result follows with any condition that guarantees a concentration result for the sum of n i.i.d. realizations of
log P1(Y )P0(Y ) . In particular, the concentration follows directly if log
P1(Y )
P0(Y )
is sub-Gaussian [23]. The adaptation of
Lemma 4 to continuous channels is discussed in Section VII-D.
As in Section IV, one may also characterize the asymptotic scaling of logM and logK for the proposed scheme.
We shall see in Section VI that the scalings of the message and key size are optimal.
Corollary 2. Consider a discrete memoryless covert communication channel with P1  P0, Q1  Q0, and
Q1 6= Q0. For any ξ ∈]0; 1[, there exist covert communication schemes such that
lim
n→∞D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
= 0, lim
n→∞Perr = 0,
lim
n→∞
logM√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Q⊗n0
) = (1− ξ)
√
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)D(P1‖P0),
lim
n→∞
logK√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Q⊗n0
) =
√
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0) [(1 + ξ)D(Q1‖Q0)− (1− ξ)D(P1‖P0)]
+ .
Proof: The result follows as in the proof of Corollary 1 and is omitted for brevity.
VI. CONVERSE RESULT FOR DMCS
In this section, we show the optimality of the asymptotic limits given in Corollary 2. The proof leverages the
converse technique and results of [4], [5], [27].
Theorem 3. Consider a discrete memoryless covert communication channel with P1  P0, Q1  Q0, and Q1 6= Q0.
Consider a sequence of covert communication schemes with increasing blocklength n characterized by n , Perr
and δn , D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
. If limn→∞ n = limn→∞ δn = 0, we have
lim
n→∞
logM√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Q⊗n0
) 6
√
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)D(P1‖P0). (78)
For a sequence of schemes such that (78) holds with equality, we have
lim
n→∞
logM + logK√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Q⊗n0
) >
√
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)D(Q1‖Q0). (79)
Proof: The proof of (78) is an adaptation of [5, Proof of Theorem 2]. The proof of (79) follows by adapting
the steps of [27, Section 5.2.3] to lower bound the sum logM + logK. We detail here the modifications required
to analyze the present setting.
Consider a sequence of length-n codes for the setting in Fig. 1 with n , Perr and δn , D(Q̂n‖Q⊗n0 ), such that
limn→∞ n = limn→∞ δn = 0, and logM takes the maximum value such that limn→∞ logM = ∞. We start by
upper bounding logM using standard techniques.
logM = H(W ) = I(W ;Y nS) +H(W |Y nS) (80)
6 I(W ;Y nS) +Hb (n) + n logM (81)
= I(W ;Y n|S) +Hb (n) + n logM (82)
6 I(WS;Y n) +Hb (n) + n logM (83)
6 I(Xn;Y n) +Hb (n) + n logM (84)
6 nI(X˜; Y˜ ) +Hb (n) + n logM, (85)
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where the random variables X˜ and Y˜ have distribution
PX˜(x) ,
1
n
n∑
i=1
PXi(x) and PX˜Y˜ (x, y) , PX˜(x)WY |X(y|x). (86)
Hence,
logM 6 1
1− n (nI(X˜; Y˜ ) +Hb (n)) . (87)
Following [27], we obtain
logM + logK > H(WS) (88)
> I(WS;Zn) (89)
(a)
> I(Xn;Zn) (90)
(b)
> nI(X˜; Z˜)− δn, (91)
where (a) follows because Xn is a function of W and S, and (b) follows by the steps of [27, Section 5.2.3] upon
defining the random variables X˜ and Z˜ to have joint distribution
PX˜Z˜(x, z) , PX˜(x)WZ|X(z|x). (92)
Following the reasoning of [5], [27], one can show
δn = D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
> nD(Q˜‖Q0) with Q˜(z) ,
n∑
i=1
1
n
Q̂i(z). (93)
Applying Pinsker’s inequality, we see that limn→∞V(Q˜,Q0) = 0 so that ∀z limn→∞ Q˜(z) = Q0(z), and PX˜ must
be of the form
PX˜(x) = (1− µn)1 {x = x0}+ µn1 {x = x1} with limn→∞µn = 0.
Using the notation of Section III, we may write PX˜ = Πµn , Q˜ = Qµn , and PY˜ = Pµn . Using the bounds given in
Lemma 1, we find that
µ2n
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0) (1−√µn) 6 D(Qµn‖Q0) 6
µ2n
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0) (1 +√µn) , (94)
I(X˜; Y˜ ) 6 µnD(P1‖P0)− D(Pµn‖P0) 6 µnD(P1‖P0), (95)
I(X˜; Z˜) = µnD(Q1‖Q0)− D(Qµn‖Q0). (96)
Note that the lower bound of D(Qµn‖Q0) in (94) combined with the inequality in (93) imposes that limn→∞
√
nµn =
0. The constraint limn→∞ logM =∞ combined with (87) and (95) also requires that limn→∞ nµn =∞. Hence,
logM√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Q⊗n0
) 6 nI(X˜; Y˜ ) +Hb (n)(1− n)√n2D(Qµn‖Q0)
6 µnD(P1‖P0) +
1
nHb (n)
(1− n)
√
1
2µ
2
nχ2(Q1‖Q0) (1−
√
µn)
6
√
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)
D(P1‖P0) + 1nµn
(1− n)
√(
1−√µn
) ,
and
lim
n→∞
logM√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Qn0
) 6
√
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)D(P1‖P0). (97)
16
For any sequence of codes such that (97) holds with equality, which we know is indeed possible from Corollary 2, (87)
combined with (95) and limn→∞ nµn =∞ impose that for any ρ > 0,
(1− ρ)
√
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)D(P1‖P0) 6 limn→∞
nµnD(P1‖P0)√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Qn0
) . (98)
Hence, combing (91), (96), (98), we obtain for any ρ > 0
logM + logK√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Q⊗n0
) > nµnD(Q1‖Q0)− nD(Qµn‖Q0)− δn√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Q⊗n0
)
> (1− ρ)
√
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)
(
D(Q1‖Q0)− 1
µn
D(Qµn‖Q0)−
δn
nµn
)
.
Since ρ > 0 is arbitrary, we have
lim
n→∞
logM + logK√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Q⊗n0
) >
√
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)D(Q1‖Q0).
If WZ|X = WY |X , the right hand side of (78) is actually a special case of [5, Theorem 2] for two inputs.
VII. EXTENSIONS AND APPLICATIONS
A. Non-vanishing D(Q̂n‖Q⊗n0 )
Instead of requiring that limn→∞D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
= 0, we could relax the constraint by asking that limn→∞D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
=
δ for some chosen δ > 0. The optimal scalings of logM and logK with n obtained in this case are summarized in
Table II and Table III, respectively. The result when Q1  Q0 and P1  P0 is obtained by choosing a sequence
ωn such that limn→∞ ωn = ω0 > 0 in the proof of Theorem 2. The results for the other situations are obtained
with the same modification in the analysis of Appendix G.
TABLE II
OPTIMAL SCALING OF logM FOR WHICH limn→∞ D(Q̂n‖Q⊗n0 ) = δ > 0.
P1  P0 P1 /P0 P1 = P0
Q1  Q0 Θ(√n) Θ(√n logn) 0
Q1 /Q0 0 0 0
Q1 = Q0 Θ(n) Θ(n) 0
TABLE III
OPTIMAL SCALING OF logK FOR WHICH limn→∞ D(Q̂n‖Q⊗n0 ) = δ > 0.
P1  P0 P1 /P0 P1 = P0
Q1  Q0 Θ(√n) 0 0
Q1 /Q0 0 0 0
Q1 = Q0 0 0 0
B. Multiple symbols
A close inspection of the proofs shows that the calculations may be extended to multiple symbols {xi}i∈J1,NK such
that ∀i ∈ J1, NK xi 6= x0. Specifically, assume that each symbol xi is assigned probability piαn, with ∑Ni=1 pi = 1.
Denote Pi ,WY |X=xi and Qi ,WZ|X=xi . Following verbatim the approach of Section III-A, one may redefine
Qαn(z) = αn
N∑
i=1
piQi(z) + (1− αn)Q0(z), (99)
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so that for all n ∈ N∗,
D(Qαn‖Q0) 6
α2n
2
χ
2
(∑
i
piQi
∥∥∥∥∥Q0
)
− α
3
n
6
χ
3
(∑
i
piQi
∥∥∥∥∥Q0
)
+
α4n
3
χ
4
(∑
i
piQi
∥∥∥∥∥Q0
)
. (100)
and for n large enough,
D(Qαn‖Q0) >
α2n
2
χ
2
(∑
i
piQi
∥∥∥∥∥Q0
)
− α3n
(
1
2
χ
3
(∑
i
piQi
∥∥∥∥∥Q0
)
− 1
3
η
3
(∑
i
piQi
∥∥∥∥∥Q0
))
+
2α4n
3
η
4
(∑
i
piQi
∥∥∥∥∥Q0
)
. (101)
Following the proof of Theorem 2, we then obtain the following result.
Theorem 4. Consider a discrete memoryles covert communication channel such that Q0 is is not a mixture of
{Qi}i∈J1,NK and ∀i ∈ J1, NK Qi  Q0 and Pi  P0. Let {pi}i∈J1,NK ∈ [0; 1]N be such that ∑Ni=1 pi = 1 and let
αn , ωn√n with ωn ∈ o(1) ∩ ω( 1√n) as n → ∞. For any ξ ∈]0; 1[, there exist ξ1, ξ2 > 0 depending on ξ, WY |X ,
WZ|X , and a covert communication scheme as in Fig. 3 such that, for n large enough,
logM = (1− ξ)ωn
√
n
(∑
i
piD(Pi‖P0)
)
logK = ωn
√
n
[
(1 + ξ)
N∑
i=1
piD(Qi‖Q0)− (1− ξ)
∑
i
piD(Pi‖P0)
]+
and
Perr 6 e−ξ1ωn
√
n,
∣∣D(Q̂n‖Q⊗n0 )− D(Q⊗nαn‖Q⊗n0 )∣∣ 6 e−ξ2ωn√n,
In particular, we obtain a characterization of the asymptotic scaling.
Corollary 3. Consider a discrete memoryles covert communication channel such that Q0 is is not a mixture of
{Qi}i∈J1,NK and ∀i ∈ J1, NK Qi  Q0 and Pi  P0. Let {pi}i∈J1,NK ∈ [0; 1]N be such that ∑Ni=1 pi = 1. Then,
there exist covert communication schemes such that
lim
n→∞D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
= 0, lim
n→∞Perr = 0,
lim
n→∞
logM√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Q⊗n0
) =
√√√√ 2
χ
2
(∑N
i=1 piQi
∥∥∥Q0)
N∑
i=1
piD(Pi‖P0),
lim
n→∞
logK√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Q⊗n0
) =
√√√√ 2
χ
2
(∑N
i=1 piQi
∥∥∥Q0)
[
N∑
i=1
pi (D(Qi‖Q0)− D(Pi‖P0))
]+
.
One can also show the optimality of the scalings by following [4], [5] and adapting the proof of Theorem 3.
C. Covert and secret communication
The problem as formulated in Section III only requires communication to be undetectable but does not prevent the
warden from extracting information about the transmitted message. To address this, one could consider an additional
semantic secrecy [28] constraint of the form
∀pW lim
n→∞ I(W ;Z
n) = 0. (102)
The problem is then similar to the effective secrecy introduced in [15], [29] in a regime of undetectable communication,
and similar to the “hidable and deniable” communication setting in [8].
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The architecture studied in Section IV already satisfies this condition because the modulation as per (19) performs
a one-time pad of the encoded message bits with the key bits Ŝ. If one does not wish to use an extra key for secrecy,
then the next theorem shows that semantic secrecy may be obtained “for free” when D(P1‖P0) > D(Q1‖Q0), by
using a code for the wiretap channel instead of a code for reliable communication.
Theorem 5. Consider a discrete memoryless covert communication channel with P1  P0, Q1  Q0, and Q1 6= Q0.
Let αn , ωn√n with ωn ∈ o(1) ∩ ω( 1√n) as n → ∞. For any ξ ∈]0; 1[, there exist ξ1, ξ2, ξ3 > 0 depending on ξ,
WY |X , WZ|X , and a covert communication scheme such that, for n large enough,
logM = (1− ξ)ωn
√
nD(P1‖P0), logK = (1 + ξ)ωn
√
nD(Q1‖Q0),
and
Perr 6 e−ξ1ωn
√
n,
∣∣D(Q̂n‖Q⊗n0 )− D(Q⊗nαn‖Q⊗n0 )∣∣ 6 e−ξ2ωn√n, ∀pW I(W ;Zn) 6 e−ξ3ωn√n.
Proof: We only sketch the details here for brevity. Let ξ ∈]0; 1[ and n ∈ N∗ sufficiently large.
If (1 − ξ)D(P1‖P0) 6 (1 + ξ)D(Q1‖Q0), we know from Theorem 2 that we may transmit logM = (1 −
ξ)ωn
√
nD(P1‖P0) message bits with the help of ωn
√
n ((1 + ξ)D(Q1‖Q0)− (1− ξ)D(P1‖P0)) key bits. One may
render the message bits secret by performing a one-time pad requiring another (1− ξ)ωn
√
nD(P1‖P0) key bits, for
a total of (1 + ξ)ωn
√
nD(Q1‖Q0) key bits.
If (1− ξ)D(P1‖P0) > (1 + ξ)D(Q1‖Q0), we modify the random coding argument of Theorem 2 as follows. Let
M,M ′ ∈ N∗. Generate MM ′ codewords xij ∈ {x0, x1}n with i ∈ J1,MK and j ∈ J1,M ′K. The index i is used to
encode a message W while j is used to encode another message W ′. Following the exact same reliability analysis
as in the proof of Theorem 2, we conclude that if
logM + logM ′ = (1− ξ)ωn
√
nD(P1‖P0) (103)
then E(Perr) 6 e−ρ1ωn
√
n for some ρ1 > 0. Following the principle of achieving secrecy from resolvability[16], we
may also prove that if
logM ′ = (1 + ξ)ωn
√
nD(Q1‖Q0) (104)
then E(I(W ;Zn)) 6 e−ρ3ωn
√
n for some ρ3 > 0. In addition, since logM + logM ′ > (1 + ξ)ωn
√
nD(Q1‖Q0),
covertness follows “for free” using the same arguments as in Theorem 2. Finally, the bits of W ′ may be protected by
a one-time pad, requiring (1 + ξ)ωn
√
nD(Q1‖Q0) key bits. The expurgation argument leading to semantic secrecy
is standard, e.g., [30, Lemma 1].
The different regimes of covert and secret communication are illustrated in Fig. 4, which shows the asymptotic
number of messages bits and keys bits scaled by
√
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)ωn
√
n as a function of D(P1‖P0) for a fixed value of
D(Q1‖Q0). As depicted by the different colors in Fig. 4, the key bits may be used either for covertness or for secrecy.
Similarly, some messages bits are intrisically covert and secret, while others require the use of a secret-key. For
D(P1‖P0) 6 D(Q1‖Q0), secret-keys are required for both covertness and secrecy while for D(P1‖P0) > D(Q1‖Q0),
secret keys are only required for added secrecy. Irrespective of the regime, the total number of secret key bits
remains the same.
D. Gaussian channels
Gaussian channels are of particular practical interest with the innocent symbol x0 = 0. Lemma 3 still applies to
continuous channels but Lemma 4 does not since µ0 = 0. Nevertheless, one may establish a slightly weaker result
in terms of the total variation. Since α+ β > 1− V(Q̂n, Q⊗n0 ), it suffices to establish that V(Q̂n, Q⊗n0 ) vanishes
to ensure covert communications. As shown in Appendix F one may adapt the proof of [26, Theorem VII.1] to
establish the following.
Lemma 5. For any channel (X ,WZ|X ,Z) and for any τ > 0,
E
(
V
(
Q̂n, Q⊗nαn
))
6 PW ⊗nZ|XΠ⊗nαn
(
log
W ⊗nZ|X(Z|X)
Q⊗n0 (Z)
> τ
)
+
1
2
√
eτ
MK
. (105)
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D(Q1 Q0)
D(P1 P0)
key for covertness
key for secrecy
message intrisically covert/secret
messagescaled number of message and key bits
Fig. 4. Illustration of different regimes of covert and secret communication.
Consequently, one may establish the following result.
Theorem 6. Consider a continuous memoryless covert communication channel with P1  P0, Q1  Q0, and
Q1 6= Q0. Assume that the random variables log Q1(Z)Q0(Z) with Z ∼ Q1 and log
P1(Y )
P0(Y )
with Y ∼ P1 are sub-Gaussian,
and
∫ P1(y)2
P0(y)
dy < ∞. let αn , ωn√n with ωn ∈ o(1) ∩ ω( 1√n) as n → ∞. For any ξ ∈]0; 1[, there exist ξ1, ξ2 > 0
depending on ξ, WY |X , WZ|X , and a covert communication scheme as in Fig. 3 such that, for n large enough,
logM = (1− ξ)ωn
√
nD(P1‖P0)
logK = ωn
√
n [(1 + ξ)D(Q1‖Q0)− (1− ξ)D(P1‖P0)]+
and
Perr 6 e−ξ1ωn
√
n, V
(
Q̂n, Q⊗nαn
)
6 e−ξ2ωn
√
n.
For an AWGN channel, note that Pi ∼ N (xi, σ). One may check that log P1(Y )P0(Y ) for Y ∼ P1 is sub-Gaussian
since
log
P1(Y )
P0(Y )
=
x1
σ2
Y − x
2
1
2σ2
, (106)
which is a Gaussian random variable. Also,∫
P1(y)
2
P0(y)
dy = e−
x21
σ2 <∞. (107)
One can finally show covertness, by using the triangle inequality to obtain
V
(
Q̂n, Q⊗n0
)
6 V
(
Q̂n, Q⊗nαn
)
+ V
(
Q⊗nαn , Q
⊗n
0
)
6 e−ξ2ωn
√
n +
√
nD(Qαn‖Q0). (108)
As in the case of DMCs, no key is required if D(P1‖P0) > D(Q1‖Q0).
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APPENDIX A
KULLBACK-LEIBLER (KL) DIVERGENCE AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING
In this section, we provide a brief discussion in the spirit of [31] to provide an alternative operational significance of
the KL divergence for hypothesis testing. While KL divergence naturally appears in the exponents of the probability
of false alarm and missed-detection when testing whether an i.i.d. process is generated according to one of two
different distributions, this interpretation is not valid in the present setting since the distribution Q̂n is not i.i.d..
Nevertheless, assume that the warden’s hypothesis test is characterized by Type I error α, Type II error β, and a
rejection region R. This hypothesis test may be viewed as a “black box” that outputs a Bernoulli random variable Bp,
indicating “0” if H0 is accepted, or “1” if H0 is rejected. If H0 is true then p = α by definition; alternatively, if H1
is true, then p = 1−β by definition. The performance of the test may be captured by computing the Jensen-Shannon
divergence [32]
J(Bα, B1−β) , D
(
Bα‖Bα+1−β
2
)
+ D
(
B1−β‖Bα+1−β
2
)
=
1
2
D(B1−β‖Bα)− D
(
Bα+1−β
2
‖Bα
)
. (109)
In fact, it is known that6 0 6 J(Bα, B1−β) 6 1, with J(Bα, B1−β) = 0 if and only if α+β = 1, and J(Bα, B1−β) = 1
if and only if α = β = 0. Hence, the value of J(Bα, B1−β) is an indication of how effective the test is.
To achieve covert communication, one must therefore ensure that J(Bα, B1−β) is small. By application of the
log-sum inequality, one obtains
2J(Bα, B1−β) 6 D(B1−β‖Bα) (110)
= (1− β) log 1− β
α
+ β log
β
1− α (111)
= P
Q̂n
(R) log
P
Q̂n
(R)
PQ⊗n0 (R)
+ P
Q̂n
(Rc) log
P
Q̂n
(Rc)
PQ⊗n0 (Rc)
(112)
6
∑
z
Q̂n(z) log
Q̂n(z)
Q⊗n0 (z)
(113)
= D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
. (114)
Hence, a sufficient condition to make the test ineffective is again to minimize D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Note that
D(Qαn‖Q0) =
∑
z∈Z
Qαn(z) log
Qαn(z)
Q0(z)
=
∑
z∈Z
(Q0(z) + αn(Q1(z)−Q0(z))) log
(
1 + αn
Q1(z)−Q0(z)
Q0(z)
)
.
(115)
Using the inequality log(1 + x) < x− x22 + x
3
3 for x > −1, we obtain
D(Qαn‖Q0) 6
∑
z∈Z
(Q0(z) + αn(Q1(z)−Q0(z)))
(
αn
Q1(z)−Q0(z)
Q0(z)
− α
2
n
2
(
Q1(z)−Q0(z)
Q0(z)
)2
+
α3n
3
(
Q1(z)−Q0(z)
Q0(z)
)3)
(116)
=
α2n
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)− α
3
n
6
χ
3
(Q1‖Q0) + α
4
n
3
χ
4
(Q1‖Q0) , (117)
6with a log to the base 2
21
Using the inequalities log(1 + x) > x− x22 for x > 0 and log(1 + x) > x− x
2
2 +
2x3
3 for x ∈ [−12 ; 0], we obtain for
αn small enough,7
D(Qαn‖Q0) >
∑
z∈Z
(Q0(z) + αn(Q1(z)−Q0(z)))
(
αn
Q1(z)−Q0(z)
Q0(z)
− α
2
n
2
(
Q1(z)−Q0(z)
Q0(z)
)2)
+
∑
z∈Z:Q1(z)−Q0(z)<0
(Q0(z) + αn(Q1(z)−Q0(z))) 2α
3
n
3
(
Q1(z)−Q0(z)
Q0(z)
)3
(118)
=
α2n
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0) + α3n
(
2
3
η
3
(Q1‖Q0)− 1
2
χ
3
(Q1‖Q0)
)
+
2α4n
3
η
4
(Q1‖Q0) . (119)
Finally, note that
I
(
PX ;WZ|X
)
= (1− αn)D(Q0‖Qαn) + αnD(Q1‖Qαn)
= (1− αn)D(Q0‖Qαn) + αnD(Q1‖Q0) + αn
∑
z
Q1(z) log
Q0(z)
Qαn(z)
= αnD(Q1‖Q0)− D(Qαn‖Q0) (120)
Combining (117), (119), and (120), we obtain the desired results.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
For any γ > 0, define the set
Snγ ,
{
x ∈ {x0, x1}n : log 1
Π⊗nαn(x)
< γ
}
. (121)
For i ∈ J1, K˜K, we denote the expected value over all random codewords {X˜j}j∈J1,K˜K\{i} by E∼i(·). Notice that
E
(
D
(
PX˜‖Π⊗nαn
))
= E
(∑
x
PX˜(x) log
PX˜(x)
Π⊗nαn(x)
)
(122)
= E
∑
x
K˜∑
i=1
1
K˜
1
{
x = X˜i
}
log
∑K˜
j=1 1
{
x = X˜j
}
K˜Π⊗nαn(x)
 (123)
=
K˜∑
i=1
1
K˜
∑
x
∑
x˜i
Πnαn,(x˜i)1 {x = x˜i}E∼i
log ∑K˜j=1 1
{
x = X˜j
}
K˜Π⊗nαn(x)
 (124)
(a)
6
K˜∑
i=1
1
K˜
∑
x
∑
x˜i
Πnαn,(x˜i)1 {x = x˜i} logE∼i
∑K˜j=1 1
{
x = X˜j
}
K˜Π⊗nαn(x)
 (125)
(b)
=
K˜∑
i=1
1
K˜
∑
x
∑
x˜i
Πnαn,(x˜i)1 {x = x˜i} log
(
1 {x = x˜i}
K˜Π⊗nαn(x)
+
K˜ − 1
K˜
Πnαn,(x)
Π⊗nαn(x)
)
(126)
6
∑
x
Πnαn,(x)log
(
1
K˜Π⊗nαn(x)
+
1
λn
)
(127)
6
∑
x/∈Snγ
1
λn
Π⊗nαn(x)log
(
1
K˜Π⊗nαn(x)
+
1
λn
)
+
∑
x∈Snγ
Πnαn,(x)log
(
1
K˜Π⊗nαn(x)
+
1
λn
)
, (128)
7αn should be such that ∀z ∈ Z with Q0(z) > 0 and Q1(z)−Q0(z) < 0 we have αn(Q1(z)−Q0(z)) > − 12Q0(z)
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where (a) follows by Jensen’s inequality and (b) holds because E∼i(1{x = X˜j}) = Πnαn,(x) for i 6= j. If x ∈ Snγ ,
we have 1 6 Π⊗nαn(x)eγ and
log
(
1
K˜Π⊗nαn(x)
+
1
λn
)
6 log
(
eγ
K˜
Π⊗nαn(x)
Π⊗nαn(x)
+
1
λn
)
= log
(
eγ
K˜
+
1
λn
)
(129)
If x /∈ Snγ , and for n large enough so that αn < 1− αn and αnn 6 λn, we have
log
(
1
K˜Π⊗nαn(x)
+
1
λn
)
6 log
(
1
αnn
+
1
λn
)
6 n log 2
αn
. (130)
Combining (128)-(130), we obtain
E
(
D
(
PX˜‖Π⊗nαn
))
6 n
λn
log
2
αn
PΠ⊗nαn
(
X /∈ Snγ
)
+ log
(
eγ
K˜
+
1
λn
)
. (131)
The result follows by observing that
PΠ⊗nαn
(
X /∈ Snγ
)
= PΠ⊗nαn
(
log
1
Π⊗nαn(X)
> γ
)
(132)
= PΠ⊗nαn
(
log
1
α
supp(X)
n (1− αn)n−supp(X)
> γ
)
(133)
= PΠ⊗nαn
(
supp(X) log
1− αn
αn
− n log(1− αn) > γ
)
(134)
= PΠ⊗nαn
(
supp(X) > γ + n log(1− αn)
log 1−αnαn
)
. (135)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
The result of the lemma could be viewed as a specific application of the κβ bound [33]. However, for clarity and
completeness, we provide here a proof from first principles. From the definition of the encoder/decoder and a union
bound, there are three error events to consider.
• The codeword xij is transmitted but (xij ,y) /∈ Anγ .
• The codeword xij is transmitted but there exists xkj with k 6= i such that (xkj ,y) ∈ Anγ .
• No communication happens but the decoder finds a codeword xij such that (xij ,y) ∈ Anγ .
Hence, we obtain
E(Perr) 6 E
∑
y
M∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
1
MK
W ⊗nY |X(y|Xij)1
{
(Xij ,y) /∈ Anγ or ∃k 6= i s.t. (Xkj ,y) ∈ Anγ
}
+ E
(∑
y
P ⊗n0 (y)1
{∃i s.t. (Xij ,y) ∈ Anγ}
)
= E
(∑
y
W ⊗nY |X(y|X11)1
{
(X11,y) /∈ Anγ or ∃k 6= 1 s.t. (Xk1,y) ∈ Anγ
})
+ E
(∑
y
P ⊗n0 (y)1
{∃i s.t. (Xij ,y) ∈ Anγ}
)
6 E
(∑
y
W ⊗nY |X(y|X11)1
{
(X11,y) /∈ Anγ
})
+
∑
k 6=1
E
(∑
y
W ⊗nY |X(y|X11)1
{
(Xk1,y) ∈ Anγ
})
+
∑
i
E
(∑
y
P ⊗n0 (y)1
{
(Xij ,y) ∈ Anγ
})
(136)
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Note that the first term on the right-hand side of (136) is
E
(∑
y
W ⊗nY |X(y|X11)1
{
(X11,y) /∈ Anγ
})
= PW ⊗nY |XΠ⊗nαn
(
log
W ⊗nY |X(Y|X)
P ⊗n0 (Y)
6 γ
)
. (137)
We now analyze the second term on the right-hand side of (136). For any k 6= 1,
E
(∑
y
W ⊗nY |X(y|X11)1
{
(Xk1,y) ∈ Anγ
})
=
∑
x
∑
y
P ⊗nαn (y)Π
⊗n
αn(x)1
{
(x,y) ∈ Anγ
}
(138)
=
∑
x
∑
y
P ⊗n0 (y)Π
⊗n
αn(x)
P ⊗nαn (y)
P ⊗n0 (y)
1
{
(x,y) ∈ Anγ
}
(139)
(a)
6
∑
x
∑
y
W ⊗nY |X(y|x)e−γΠ⊗nαn(x)
P ⊗nαn (y)
P ⊗n0 (y)
1
{
(x,y) ∈ Anγ
}
(140)
6 e−γEP ⊗nαn
(
P ⊗nαn (Y)
P ⊗n0 (Y)
)
, (141)
where (a) follows from P ⊗n0 (y) 6W ⊗nY |X(y|x)e−γ for (x,y) ∈ Anγ . Since P ⊗nαn and P ⊗n0 are product distributions,
we have
EP ⊗nαn
(
P ⊗nαn (Y)
P ⊗n0 (Y)
)
=
(
EPαn
(
Pαn(Y )
P0(Y )
))n
(142)
Next, note that
EPαn
(
Pαn(Y )
P0(Y )
)
= EPαn
(
1− αn + αnP1(Y )
P0(Y )
)
(143)
= 1− αn + αn
(∑
y
((1− αn)P0(y) + αnP1(y)) P1(y)
P0(y)
)
(144)
= 1− αn + αn
(
1− αn + αn
∑
y
P1(y)
2
P0(y)
)
(145)
= 1 + α2n(ζ − 1), with ζ ,
∑
y
P1(y)
2
P0(y)
. (146)
Consequently,
EP ⊗nαn
(
P ⊗nαn (Y)
P ⊗n0 (Y)
)
=
(
1 + α2n(ζ − 1)
)n
= exp
(
n log
(
1 + α2n(ζ − 1)
))
6 exp
(
nα2n(ζ − 1)
)
= exp
(
ω2n(ζ − 1)
)
.
(147)
Hence, we obtain
E
(∑
y
W ⊗nY |X(y|X11)1
{
(Xk1,y) ∈ Anγ
})
6 e−γ exp
(
ω2n(ζ − 1)
)
. (148)
Finally, the third term on the right-hand side of (136) may be similarly bounded for any i by
E
(∑
y
P ⊗n0 (y)1
{
(Xi1,y) ∈ Anγ
})
=
∑
x
∑
y
P ⊗n0 (y)Π
⊗n
αn(x)1
{
(x,y) ∈ Anγ
}
(149)
6
∑
x
∑
y
W ⊗nY |X(y|x)e−γΠ⊗nαn(x)1
{
(x,y) ∈ Anγ
}
(150)
6 e−γ . (151)
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Define the set
Bnτ ,
{
(x, z) ∈ X n ×Zn : log
W ⊗nZ|X(z|x)
Q⊗n0 (z)
< τ
}
(152)
For (i, j) ∈ J1,MK× J1,KK, we denote the expected value over all random codewords {X˜k`}(k,`)∈J1,MK×J1,KK\{(i,j)}
by E∼ij(·). Notice that
E
(
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
))
= E
(∑
z
Q̂n(z) log
Q̂n(z)
Q⊗nαn(z)
)
= E
∑
z
1
MK
M∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
W ⊗nZ|X(z|Xij) log
∑M
k=1
∑K
`=1W
⊗n
Z|X(z|Xk`)
MKQ⊗nαn(z)

=
1
MK
M∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
∑
z
∑
xij
W ⊗nZ|X(z|xij)Π⊗nαn(xij)E∼ij
(
log
∑M
k=1
∑K
`=1W
⊗n
Z|X(z|Xk`)
MKQ⊗nαn(z)
)
(a)
6 1
MK
M∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
∑
z
∑
xij
W ⊗nZ|X(z|xij)Π⊗nαn(xij) logE∼ij
(∑M
k=1
∑K
`=1W
⊗n
Z|X(z|Xk`)
MKQ⊗nαn(z)
)
(b)
=
1
MK
M∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
∑
z
∑
xij
W ⊗nZ|X(z|xij)Π⊗nαn(xij) log
(
W ⊗nZ|X(z|xij)
MKQ⊗nαn(z)
+
MK − 1
MK
)
=
∑
z
∑
x
W ⊗nZ|X(z|x)Π⊗nαn(x) log
(
W ⊗nZ|X(z|x)
MKQ⊗nαn(z)
+
MK − 1
MK
)
, (153)
where (a) follows by Jensen’s inequality and (b) follow because E∼ij
(
W ⊗nZ|X(z|Xk`)
)
= Q⊗nαn(z) for (k, `) 6= (i, j).
If (x, z) ∈ Bnτ , we have
log
(
W ⊗nZ|X(z|x)
MKQ⊗nαn(z)
+
MK − 1
MK
)
6 log
(
eτQ⊗n0 (z)
MKQ⊗nαn(z)
+ 1
)
6 e
τ
MK
Q⊗n0 (z)
Q⊗nαn(z)
. (154)
If (x, z) /∈ Bnτ , we have
log
(
W ⊗nZ|X(z|x)
MKQ⊗nαn(z)
+
MK − 1
MK
)
6 log
(
1
(1− αn)nµn0
+ 1
)
6 n log 2
(1− αn)µ0 . (155)
Combining (153)-(155), we obtain
E
(
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
))
6 n log 2
(1− αn)µ0
∑
z
∑
x
W ⊗nZ|X(z|x)Π⊗nαn(x)1{(x, z) /∈ Bnτ }
+
∑
z
∑
x
W ⊗nZ|X(z|x)Π⊗nαn(x)
eτ
MK
Q⊗n0 (z)
Q⊗nαn(z)
1{(x, z) ∈ Bnτ }
6 n log 2
(1− αn)µ0PW
⊗n
Z|XΠ
⊗n
αn
((X,Z) /∈ Bnτ ) +
eτ
MK
.
For n large enough so that 1− αn > 1/2, we obtain the desired result.
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We define
Q̂(1)(z) ,
M∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
WnZ|X(z|xij)
1
MK
1{(xij , z) ∈ Bnτ } (156)
Q̂(2)(z) ,
M∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
WnZ|X(z|xij)
1
MK
1{(xij , z) /∈ Bnτ } (157)
so that Q̂n = Q̂(1) + Q̂(2). Also note that E
(
Q̂(z)
)
= Q⊗nαn(z). Hence,
E
(‖Q̂n −Q⊗nαn‖) 6 12 ∑
z
E
(∣∣∣Q̂(1)(z)− E(Q̂(1)(z))∣∣∣)+ 1
2
∑
z
E
(∣∣∣Q̂(2)(z)− E(Q̂(2)(z))∣∣∣). (158)
The first term on the right-hand side of (158) is bounded as follows.
1
2
∑
z
E
(∣∣∣Q̂(1)(z)− E(Q̂(1)(z))∣∣∣) 6 1
2
∑
z
√
Var
(
Q̂(1)(z)
)
(159)
with
Var
(
Q̂(1)(z)
)
=
M∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
1
M2K2
Var
(
W ⊗nZ|X(z|Xij)1{(Xij , z) ∈ Bnτ }
)
(160)
=
1
MK
Var
(
W ⊗nZ|X(z|X11)1{(X11, z) ∈ Bnτ }
)
(161)
6 1
MK
EΠ⊗nαn
(
W ⊗nZ|X(z|X)21{(X, z) ∈ Bnτ }
)
(162)
=
1
MK
∑
x
W ⊗nZ|X(z|x)2Π⊗nαn(x)1{(x, z) ∈ Bnτ } (163)
(a)
6 1
MK
∑
x
W ⊗nZ|X(z|x)Q⊗n0 (z)eτΠ⊗nαn(x)1{(x, z) ∈ Bnτ } (164)
6 1
MK
Q⊗n0 (z)
2eτ
Q⊗nαn(z)
Q⊗n0 (z)
, (165)
where (a) follows because W ⊗nZ|X(z|x) 6 Q⊗n0 (z)eτ for (x, z) ∈ Bnτ . Hence,
1
2
∑
z
E
(∣∣∣Q̂(1)(z)− E(Q̂(1)(z))∣∣∣) 6 1
2
∑
z
√
1
MK
Q⊗n0 (z)
2eτ
Q⊗nαn(z)
Q⊗n0 (z)
=
1
2
√
eτ
MK
∑
z
Q⊗n0 (z)
√
Q⊗nαn(z)
Q⊗n0 (z)
. (166)
By Jensen’s inequality and the concavity of x 7→ √x, we have∑
z
Q⊗n0 (z)
√
Q⊗nαn(z)
Q⊗n0 (z)
6
√∑
z
Q⊗nαn(z) = 1, (167)
so that
1
2
∑
z
E
(∣∣∣Q̂(1)(z)− E(Q̂(1)(z))∣∣∣) 6 1
2
√
eτ
M
. (168)
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The second term on the right-hand side of (158).
1
2
∑
z
E
(∣∣∣Q̂(2)(z)− E(Q̂(2)(z))∣∣∣) 6∑
z
E
(
Q̂(2)(z)
)
(169)
=
∑
z
M∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
∑
xij
W ⊗nZ|X(z|xij)Π⊗nαn(xij)
1
MK
1{(xij , z) /∈ Bnτ } (170)
=
∑
z
∑
x
W ⊗nZ|X(z|x)Π⊗nαn(x)1{(x, z) /∈ Bnτ } (171)
= PW ⊗nZ|XΠ⊗nαn
(
log
W ⊗nZ|X(Z|X)
Q⊗n0 (Z)
> τ
)
. (172)
APPENDIX G
SPECIAL CASES OF CHANNELS
In this Appendix, we discuss some special cases of channels that have been excluded by the assumptions P1  P0,
Q1  Q0, and Q1 6= Q0, made in Section III.
A. Q1 is not absolutely continuous w.r.t. Q0 or Q1 = Q0
If Q1 is not absolutely continuous w.r.t. Q0 then D(Q1‖Q0) = ∞. Hence, for any n ∈ N∗ and any sequence
x ∈ {x0, x1}n distinct from the all-x0 sequence, we have
D
(
WZn|Xn=x‖Q⊗n0
)
=
n∑
i=1
D
(
WZ|X=xi‖Q0
)
=∞. (173)
Consequently, it is impossible to transmit covert bits.
If Q1 = Q0, for any n ∈ N∗ and any transmitted sequence x ∈ {x0, x1}n, we have D
(
WZn|Xn=x‖Q⊗n0
)
= 0, i.e.,
the warden’s observations are independent of the transmitted signals and always have distribution Q⊗n0 . One may
therefore use a standard error-control code for reliability over the main channel and transmit at non-vanishing rates
approaching the capacity of the main channel. The corresponding scaling of logM is Θ(n).
B. P1 is not absolutely continuous w.r.t. P0
If P1 is not absolutely continuous w.r.t. P0, denoted P1 /P0, define
S , {y ∈ Y : P1(y) > 0 and P0(y) = 0} and κ ,
∑
y∈S
P1(y). (174)
In other words, κ is the probability that the symbol x1 is identified without ambiguity at the channel output. We
then have the following.
Theorem 7. Consider a discrete memoryless covert communication channel with P1 /P0, Q1  Q0, and Q1 6= Q0.
Let κ be defined as per (174) and let αn , ωn√n with ωn ∈ o(1) ∩ ω( 1√n) as n→∞. For any ξ ∈]0; 1[, there exist
ξ1, ξ2 > 0 depending on ξ, WY |X , WZ|X , and covert communication schemes such that, for all n large enough,
logM = (1− ξ)κ
(
1
2
+
logω−1n
log n
)
ωn
√
n log n, logK = 0,
and
Perr 6 e−ξ1ωn
√
n,
∣∣D(Q̂n‖Q⊗n0 )− D(Q⊗nαn‖Q⊗n0 )∣∣ 6 e−ξ2ωn√n.
Proof: The result follows with a modification of the proof of Theorem 2 to exploit the property P1 /P0. Let
δ > 0, M ∈ N∗, and αn , ωn√n . Generate M codewords xi with i ∈ J1,MK independently according to the product
distribution Π⊗nαn . Upon receiving y, the decoder looks for symbols that belong to S . Let P(y) denote the positions
of these symbols. Then,
• if |P(y)| < (1− δ)nκαn declare that T̂ = 0;
• else, if there exists a unique i ∈ J1,MK such that codeword xi has x1-symbols for all positions in P(y),
declare T̂ = 1 and output message Ŵ = i;
• otherwise, declare an error.
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a) Channel reliability analysis: By construction, the decoder makes an error if any of the following events
occur.
• The codeword xi is transmitted but there are fewer than (1− δ)nκαn x1-symbols in P(y).
• The codeword xi is transmitted but there are multiple codewords with x1-symbols for all positions in P(y).
• No communication takes place but there are more than (1− δ)nκαn x1-symbols in P(y).
By definition of S, note that |P(y)| = 0 if no communication takes place. Consequently, the probability of error
averaged over the random codebook generation satisfies
E(Perr) 6 E
(∑
y
M∑
i=1
1
M
W ⊗nY |X(y|Xi)1{|P(y)| < (1− δ)nκαn or ∃j 6= i such that ∀k ∈ S Xj,k = Xi,k}
)
(175)
6 E
(∑
y
W ⊗nY |X(y|X1)1{|P(y)| < (1− δ)nκαn}
)
+
∑
j 6=1
E
(∑
y
W ⊗nY |X(y|X1)1{|P(y)| > (1− δ)nκαn and ∀k ∈ S Xj,k = X1,k}
)
(176)
= PP ⊗nαn (|P(Y)| < (1− δ)nκαn)
+
∑
j 6=1
∑
x
∑
x′
∑
y
Π⊗nαn(x)Π
⊗n
αn(x
′)W ⊗nY |X(y|x)1{|P(y)| > (1− δ)nκαn and ∀k ∈ S x′k = xk}
(177)
6 PP ⊗nαn (|P(Y)| < (1− δ)nκαn) +
∑
j 6=1
∑
x
∑
y
Π⊗nαn(x)W
⊗n
Y |X(y|x)1{|P(y)| > (1− δ)nκαn}α|P(y)|n
(178)
6 PP ⊗nαn (|P(Y)| < (1− δ)nκαn) +Mα(1−δ)nκαnn . (179)
Since |P(Y)| = ∑ni=1 1{Yi ∈ S} and EP ⊗nαn (|P(Y)|) = αnnκ = ωn√nκ, a Chernoff bound guarantees that
PP ⊗nαn (|P(Y)| < (1− δ)αnnκ) 6 e−
δ2
2
ωn
√
nκ. (180)
Hence, for any µ ∈]0; 1[, choosing
logM = (1− µ)(1− δ)κ
(
1
2
+
logω−1n
log n
)
ωn
√
n log n (181)
ensures that
E(Perr) 6 e−ρ1ωn
√
n for some appropriate choice of ρ1 > 0. (182)
b) Channel resolvability analysis: Lemma 4 still applies and one may pursue the same analysis as in the proof
of Theorem 2. In fact, the choice of logM in (181) is overwhelmingly larger than the minimum required to ensure
E
(
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
))
6 e−ρ2ωn
√
n for some appropriate choice of ρ2 > 0. (183)
Note that this may be achieved without using any secret key. The final steps of the proof are identical to those in
the proof of Theorem 2.
We may also identify the corresponding asymptotic scaling constant of logM .
Corollary 4. Consider a discrete memoryless covert communication channel with P1 /P0, Q1  Q0, and Q1 6= Q0.
Let κ be defined as per (174) and ωn ∈ o(1)∩ ω( 1√n) as n→∞. Then, for any ξ ∈]0; 1[, there exist keyless covert
communication schemes such that
lim
n→∞D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
= 0, lim
n→∞Perr = 0,
lim
n→∞
logM√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Q⊗n0
)
log n
= (1− ξ)κ
√
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)
(
1
2
+ lim
n→∞
logω−1n
log n
)
.
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Proof: Follows from steps identical to the proof of Corollary 1.
Notice that the optimal scaling constant depends on the exact choice of ωn ∈ o(1) ∩ ω( 1√n). This differs from
the situation of Corollary 2, in which the scaling constant remains the same for all choices of ωn ∈ o(1) ∩ ω( 1√n).
This coding scheme turns out to be optimal, as one may establish the following converse result.
Theorem 8. Consider a discrete memoryless covert communication channel with P1 /P0, Q1  Q0, and Q1 6= Q0.
Consider a sequence of covert communication schemes with increasing blocklength n characterized by n , Perr and
δn , D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
. If limn→∞M =∞ and limn→∞ n = limn→∞ δn = 0, there exists $n ∈ o(1) ∩ ω( 1√n logn) as
n→∞ such that
lim
n→∞
logM√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Q⊗n0
)
log n
6 κ
√
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)
(
1
2
+ lim
n→∞
log$−1n
log n
)
Proof: The converse proof technique of Theorem 3 applies but we cannot rely on Lemma 1 to bound I(X˜; Y˜ )
with X˜ ∼ Πµn since P1 /P0. We use instead the following bound.
I(X˜; Y˜ ) = (1− µn)D(P0‖Pµn) + µnD(P1‖Pµn) (184)
= (1− µn)
∑
y∈Y\S
P0(y) log
P0(y)
Pµn(y)
+ µn
∑
y∈Y\S
P1(y) log
P1(y)
Pµn(y)
− µnκ logµn (185)
6 log 1
1− µn + µn
∑
y∈Y\S
P1(y) log
P1(y)
P0(y)
+ µnκ logµ
−1
n , (186)
where the last inequality follows because Pµn(y) > (1− µn)P0(y). Since limn→∞
√
nµn = 0 for the same reason
as in the proof of Theorem 3, we may write µn = $n√n with $n = o(1). If limn→∞ logM =∞ then (87) and (186)
impose that
lim
n→∞nµn logµ
−1
n = limn→∞
√
n$n
(
1
2
log n+ log$−1n
)
=∞. (187)
Assume that $n ∈ O( 1√n logn). Then, there exists 0 < A < ∞ such that, for all n large enough, $n 6 A√n logn .
Since x 7→ x log 1x is increasing for x ∈ [0, 1/e], we must have for all n large enough
lim
n→∞
√
n$n
(
1
2
log n+ log$−1n
)
6 A
2
+ lim
n→∞
A
log n
(
1
2
log n+ log log n
)
= A <∞.
This contradicts (187), therefore $n ∈ ω( 1√n logn). Consequently,
lim
n→∞
logM√
nD
(
Q̂
n‖Q⊗n0
)
log n
6 lim
n→∞
nI(X˜; Y˜ ) +Hb (n)√
n2D(Qµn‖Q0) log n
(188)
6 lim
n→∞
µnκ logµ
−1
n − log(1− µn) + µn
∑
y∈Y\S P1(y) log
P1(y)
P0(y)
+ 1nHb (n)√
1
2µ
2
nχ2(Q1‖Q0) (1−
√
µn) log n
(189)
= lim
n→∞
κ
2 − κ log$nlogn − log(1−µn)µn logn + 1logn
∑
y∈Y\S P1(y) log
P1(y)
P0(y)
+ 1nµn lognHb (n)√
1
2χ2(Q1‖Q0) (1−
√
µn)
(190)
= κ
√
2
χ
2
(Q1‖Q0)
(
1
2
+ lim
n→∞
log$−1n
log n
)
. (191)
Note that Corollary 4 and Theorem 8 differ in the choice of scaling for ωn and $n. However, note that for
$n ∈ o(1) ∩ ω( 1√n logn), we have for all n large enough
log$−1n
log n
6 log(
√
n log n)
log n
=
1
2
+
log logn
log n
, (192)
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so that limn→∞
log$−1n
logn 6
1
2 . By choosing ωn = n
−1/2 for any  ∈]0; 1/2[ in Corollary 4, we obtain limn→∞ log$
−1
n
logn =
, which can be made arbitrary close to 12 . In that regard, the converse is asymptotically tight.
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